Zanii Proof

Privacy

Choose commitments and selected disclosures before publishing evidence.

CaptureControlOversightPrivacyComplianceCommerceProvenance

80 source modules; the private verifier build is excluded. Availability and test evidence are separate. No module is labeled hosted/live without recorded operational evidence.

Module and jobDeliveryVerification evidence
@zanii/age-assurance

Provable age-gate attestations without storing the ID - a real 2026 regulatory wave (UK Online Safety Act, EU, US state laws). Prove an age threshold was checked (over-18, over-13) by a named method/provider, committing only a salted subject reference and the boolean result - never the DOB, never the document. The provider check is INJECTED (age-verification service / document check / reusable ID): we prove the gate happened, you supply the trust root; it does not assert the person truly meets the threshold.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/custody-verdicts

The one custody verifier: computes the eight subject-page verdict rows (purpose, self-sovereign, nobody-read-it, never-trained-on, no-copy-kept, residency, subprocessor, minimization) from an offline-verified SubjectHistory. Pure, synchronous, no network. The subject page and @zanii/cli call this same function.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/data-custody

Prove what happened to the DATA an agent touched - every touch of a user's document, where it went, and when the original was destroyed. NOT supply-chain @zanii/custody (physical goods). A custody record is a Proof receipt with the data ref as its subject_tag: same chain, same anchor, verified with verifyReceiptChain unchanged, read via the existing /v1/subjects/{tag}. Purpose is bound to the delegation (data.<class>.<op> targets), so a read-scoped agent physically cannot record an export. Hashes only; the party being audited is us.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/minimization

Prove data minimization (GDPR Art. 5(1)(c)) - unprovable today, only assertable. Commit the declared MINIMUM field set, then prove every field an agent accessed was inside it; any access outside the declared minimum is a flagged violation. Composes @zanii/redact field commitments and purpose-bound delegation into a proof a regulator accepts. Proves declared-vs-accessed, not that the minimum itself was well-chosen.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/pq

Post-quantum migration rails - hybrid dual-signing (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65, both must verify), a PQ key binding signed by BOTH keys (proves possession of each), and a transition record anchored into the Merkle log so the binding provably predates any future break of Ed25519. Old receipts are not re-signed: their post-quantum protection is the anchored timestamp, and we say so.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/redact

Selective disclosure for Zanii receipts - prove an agent acted on specific data without revealing the rest, via salted field commitments and Merkle inclusion proofs.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/residency

Prove where an agent's data physically stayed - bind a region attestation to each data touch, confirm the attested region is inside a declared jurisdiction, and emit a receipt the moment it crosses a border. Answers 'prove it never left the UAE / the EU.' The region signal is INJECTED (cloud-provider region / TEE geolocation) - we verify the binding, you supply the geo trust root; the proof is only as strong as that source. A cross-border transfer rule table for UAE PDPL, DIFC and ADGM (labelled, not legal advice) checks each touch's destination.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/retention

Provable data-deletion attestations for GDPR Art. 17 - signed, timestamped receipts that reference the erased subject by a salted commitment, never raw PII.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/subject

Per-subject auditability: end users hold their own key and independently verify what agents did on their account — a pseudonymous, platform-scoped subject_tag receipt slice — without seeing anyone else's.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/subprocessor

Prove the onward-transfer chain - which downstream processors actually saw the data, under which agreement (zero-retention, DPA id), tied to the junction/settlement. Answers the exact GDPR Art. 28 question every AI DPA raises: 'you sent my data to OpenAI, who sent it where?' A transfer to a party not in the declared subprocessor list is a provable, flagged violation. Proves recorded transfers; an off-record leak needs an attested enclave.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/train

Training-data provenance: hash a training set into a sorted-Merkle manifest, then PROVE a named subject's data was absent from a real training run - a non-membership proof anyone can check offline. 'It was never used to train a model' becomes a yes, not a promise. Proves what was recorded went in; cannot prove an off-manifest copy didn't (state the enclave boundary).

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified
@zanii/zk

Small, honest privacy primitives for Zanii: Pedersen commitments on ristretto255 with provable aggregates (a total or count opened while every individual value stays hidden), hash-chain threshold proofs (value >= t without revealing the value), and salted set membership. Offline-verifiable; no SNARKs, and each primitive states exactly what it proves.

Usable source / SDKnot assessed
Hosted: unverified

Blackbox and Certify

These are separate products. Their hosted gateway availability has not been verified by this deployment. Source packages and integration examples do not establish that a hosted workflow is live.